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FILLING A REGULATORY GAP: IT IS TIME TO
REGULATE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*
The recent credit crisis has highlighted the lack of
regulation for credit default swaps that has both magnified and
contributed to market failure that began in the latter half of 2008.1
Securities regulation covers most types of investment contracts,
but currently does not include non-securities based derivative
contracts such as credit default swaps.2 The unique aspect of credit
default swaps is that unlike other risk shifting contracts such as
insurance, they are not regulated. The diverse regulatory schemes
for insurance, securities, and commodities futures contracts do not
cover over-the-counter credit default swaps. Thus, even though
like insurance, left unregulated, credit default swaps run the risk of
being nothing more than a form of legalized gambling. This essay
examines the regulation of instruments similar to credit default
swaps and concludes that credit default swaps should be regulated
as well.
A credit default swap (CDS) is a derivative investment that
has been the topic of much discussion over the past several
months. Unregulated CDSs have been justified as a useful device
for dealing with risk. There are many other risk shifting devices
* Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill School of Law. This Article is an expanded version of an article that will appear
in the second issue of 34 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 3 (forthcoming winter of 2009).
Portions are also adopted from Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes
for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and
Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 375 (2005).
1. For a discussion of the factors contributing to the crisis see Eamonn Moran,
Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 5 (2009).
2. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2A, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-l(a) (2006) (providing "[t]he
definition of 'security' in section 77b(a)(1) of this title does not include any non-
security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206C of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act)." Security-based swap agreements are not securities either, but they are
subject to the federal securities laws' antifraud provisions. See id. at § 77b-l(b); also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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including traditional insurance. Insurance, of course is a regulated
activity, with state-based insurance regulation.3 There currently is
increasing sentiment to regulate the CDS market. Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Cox has called for a centralized
regulated CDS clearing system.4 The President's Working Group
on the credit crisis also proposed centralizing the CDS market.
New York State announced plans to regulate CDS transactions as
insurance but has since decided to delay that action. But why limit
the discussion relating to swap regulation to the CDS markets?
Unregulated derivatives include over-the-counter foreign currency
(Forex) contracts, interest rate swaps, equity swaps, and other
highly complex derivatives that may equally warrant some sort of
regulation. The discussion below explains why regulation of the
over-the-counter derivatives markets is warranted.
Derivative (futures and option) contracts are publicly
traded on the various commodities exchanges subject to federal
regulation by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC).5 Derivatives based on securities and related financial
instruments are publicly traded on the securities exchanges which
are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Investing in securities is generally considered to be a
productive activity as it allows businesses to raise capital which in
turn increases productivity and benefits society. Securities
investing offers the hope of wealth building for those who invest.
Derivatives and insurance provide an opportunity for risk-shifting
as well as investment opportunities (often thought of as
speculation).6 Individuals and businesses who have exposure to
3. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 51-84 (2d
ed. 1996).
4. Subsequently, the SEC agreed to allow LCH Clearnet Ltd. to operate as a
central clearing party for credit default swaps. See News Release, SEC, SEC
Approves Exemptions to Allow Central Counterparty for Credit Default Swaps
(Dec. 23, 2008), available at 2008 WL 5342187.
5. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006). In December
2008, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange applied to the CFTC to be recognized as a
centralized clearing entity for credit default swaps. See News Release, CFTC, CFTC
Announces that CME has Certified a Proposal to Clear Credit Default Swaps (Dec.
23, 2008), available at 2008 WL 5342186.
6. See, e.g., Philip McBride Johnson, Stepping it Up, FOW DERIVATIVES
INTELLIGENCE FOR THE RISK PROF'L, Issue 336 (Nov. 2001) (stating "[d]erivatives
have always been a type of insurance. They differ from the classical model only in
that, instead of assembling a 'risk pool' funded by a large number of at-risk holders,
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risk can either hedge against that risk with a derivatives contract or
seek insurance against losses that could occur if the contingencies
created by the risk materialize.7
In contrast to investing, hedging, and insurance, gambling is
not generally viewed as a productive activity or one that provides a
benefit to society." The only benefit attributed to gambling is the
entertainment it provides. Long ago, all forms of gambling were
outlawed, primarily for moral reasons. Over time, gambling
regulation was eased significantly as additional forms of legalized
gambling were recognized. Current law takes the view that when
properly regulated, gambling's entertainment value can outweigh
the social costs and moral objections to wagers and other gambling
activities, but gambling is only permitted under strict regulation. 9
Many gambling contracts remain illegal.' °
the risk is passed on to people who would not otherwise face it. The world's most
legendary speculators are the 'Names' of Lloyd's of London").
7. Hedging operates as a form of insurance. As explained long ago by one
court:
Hedging affords such protection; it is in the nature of price
insurance. The real difference between hedging and gambling is
that the hedger has a legitimate interest to protect apart from the
hedging transactions, while the gambler has no interest except in
the transactions depending on the rise and fall of the market. An
insurance contract becomes a wager when the insured has no
legitimate interest to be protected against the happening of the
event insured against.
Boillin-Harrison Co. v. Lewis & Co., 182 Tenn. 342, 359, 187 S.W.2d 17, 24 (1945)
(citing Edwin W. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering on Produce Exchanges, 40 YALE
L. J. 843-884 (1931)) (providing an interesting discussion of the practice of hedging).
8. See, e.g., IAN AYERS, EDWARD J. MURPHY, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN
CONTRACT LAW 612 (6th ed. 2003) (stating "[i]t is ... not always easy to distinguish
illegal wagering contracts from other 'aleatory' contracts that have a legitimate
commercial or other purpose and are not considered contrary to public policy.
Likewise insurance contracts can often be characterized as wagers (and vice versa)").
9. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 132 (forthcoming 2009), implementing the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5361 et seq. (2009)
which prohibits the transmission of funds to gaming sites, regardless of where the
gaming sites are located.
10. See, e.g. David B. McGinty, The Near-Regulation of Online Sports Wagering
by United States v. Cohen, 7 GAMING L. REV. 205 (2003) (demonstrating that every
state except Utah and Hawaii have some form of legalized gambling); Cory
Aronovitz, The Regulation of Commercial Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 181 (2002)
(discussing legalized gambling); Paul D. Delva, Comment, The Promises and Perils of
Legalized Gambling for Local Governments: Who Decides How to Stack the Deck?,
68 TEMP. L. REV. 847, 847-49 (1995) (discussing increased legalization); see also, e.g.,
2009]
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The earliest permissible derivative contracts in the United
States were commodity futures contracts traded on public
commodity exchanges. The parallel between illegal gambling and
permissible derivatives is demonstrated by the following example.
Consider two inveterate gamblers who make a wager on whether it
will rain the next day. This contract would be considered an illegal
wager under the law of most states. Compare this gamble with a
farmer who is concerned about a predicted drought and wants to
hedge against loss of crops by entering into a derivatives contract
based on corn.11 This is legal as a forward or futures contract and
will be enforced. Alternatively, the farmer could make the hedge
specifically against damage due to drought and enter into a
derivatives contract based on the weather. This more closely
resembles the illegal weather wager, but would be a legitimate and
hence enforceable derivatives contract. That same farmer has the
alternative of seeking crop insurance or drought insurance. In all
of the above situations one party (the farmer) is allocating to the
other (the counterparty) the risk of a drought. The rain wager is
illegal but the futures, forward, and derivatives contracts, as well as
insurance, are legitimate commercial transactions.
A similar point could be made with respect to sports wagers
which are not permitted except to a limited extent through some
RICHARD MCGOWAN, STATE LOTTERIES AND LEGALIZED GAMBLING, 3-21 (1994)
(examining the legalization of gambling); R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn,
From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger of Law and Politics in the World of
Gambling, 72 MISS. L.J. 565 (2002) (discussing the consequences of increased
legalized gambling); John Warren Kindt & John K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling's
Destabilization of U.S. Financial Institutions, and the Banking Industry: Issues in
Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social Norm Production, 9 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 21 (2002)
(discussing the societal costs of legalized gambling and bankruptcies); Kathryn R.L.
Rand, There Are no Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5
CHAP. L. REV. 47 (2002) (evaluating legalized casino gambling on Indian
reservations); Wendy J. Johnson, Tribal Gaming Expansion in Oregon, 37
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 399 (2001) (discussing gambling in Oregon); A. Gregory Gibbs,
Note, Anchorage: Gaming Capital of the Pacific Rim, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 343 (2000)
(discussing gambling in Alaska); John W. Kindt, Increased Crime and Legalized
Gambling Operations: The Impact on the Socio-Economics of Business and
Government, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 538 (1994) (discussing the impact of
decriminalization of gambling).
11. See, e.g., Scott Marc Kolbrenner, Derivatives Design and Taxation, 15 VA.
TAX REV. 211, 217 (1995) (stating "[j]ike someone seeking catastrophic health
insurance, for example, a hedger is thought of as a risk-averse party seeking to pass
on an amount of risk to a risk-neutral (or less risk-averse) party, such as an insurance
company, better able to bear it").
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state sanctioned casinos. Consider, a hotel owner in New York
located near Yankee Stadium who wanted to hedge against the
possibility that the New York Yankees will not qualify for the
division playoffs, knowing that a divisional playoff in New York
would have allowed him to charge premium rates. Should the
hotel owner be able to enter into a commercial hedging
transaction? Furthermore, even under those limited circumstances
where sports wagers may be legal, participants in the sport are not
able to wager even though such a wager could arguably be
defended as hedging against the financial loss that would result
from losing the sporting event. The similarity to gambling is no
less when thinking about synthetic collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs) or CDSs where the counterparties have no direct
exposure to the underlying risks.
One answer to the charge that many derivatives are
nothing more than legalized gambling is that they provide
legitimate hedging opportunities for investors and, more
importantly, for commercial participants in the underlying
commodities markets. It is also often pointed out that speculators
help make markets more efficient by providing additional liquidity
which in turn performs a price discovery function. Hedging
operates much like insurance as it allows a risk averse party to pass
the risk on to someone else who is willing to bear the risk for a
premium. That premium can take the form of an insurance
premium or the cost of an options, futures, or swap contract.
With respect to traditional insurance, the risk is absorbed
by the insurance company which pools its premiums and manages
that pool as an investment to cover claims as they are made by
policy holders. It is conceivable in the derivatives markets that
both parties to a bilateral derivatives contract will be two hedgers
who are able to allocate reciprocal risks to one another. It is also
common, however, for risk averse parties seeking a derivatives
contract to look to speculators to lay off their risk. For example, a
commercial participant may not be able to locate a counterparty to
a desired hedging contract if that counterparty must itself be a
commercial hedger. Speculators may be characterized as those
who accept risk that hedgers do not want. As such, speculators can
perform an important function for commercial participants
2009]
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hedging business risks. By permitting these hedging contracts, the
opportunity for speculators is a form of legalized gambling that is
not otherwise permitted under gambling regulations. Thus, the
same type of risk shifting can be accomplished through insurance,
derivatives transactions, and simple wagers.
Publicly traded derivatives contracts are regulated by the
CFTC and in some instances by the SEC.12 Securities transactions,
insurance, and gambling are subject to extensive regulation.1
3
Until the 1980s, derivative contracts could only be traded in the
regulated commodities markets. The expansion of the exclusion of
"forward" contracts from futures contract regulation led to
emerging over-the-counter derivatives markets for certain large
investors engaged in bona fide hedging transactions. This market
expanded in the 1990s, with the CFTC taking more of a laissez-
faire approach notwithstanding the problems that befell some
derivatives investors such as the Bank of New York, Procter and
Gamble, and Orange County California.14 These unregulated
derivatives markets were given formal approval in the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000.15 The ill-advised rationale for
the absence of regulation was that the market would act as its own
regulator. This laissez-faire approach has since been recognized as
a mistake by one of its strongest supporters, former Federal
Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan.
The contract market monopoly for futures contracts eroded
due to increased use of forward contracts and swap transactions
that were pigeon-holed into existing exemptions from CFTC
regulation. The Commodity Exchange Act granted the CFTC
exclusive jurisdiction over derivatives, thus precluding SEC
12. See generally 1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
DERIVATIVES REGULATION § 1.04 (2004).
13. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel
Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24
ANN. REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 375 (2005).
14. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1278
(S.D. Ohio 1996) (explaining that interest rate swaps lacked commonality and thus
were not investment contracts); see also, e.g., Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v.
Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (S.D.
N.Y. 2001) (finding that a foreign currency swap was not a security under N.Y.'s
Martin Act).
15. Pub. Law No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1 etseq. (2006)).
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regulation of the derivatives markets.16 In the 1990s, the CFTC's
exclusive jurisdiction eased due to continued jurisdictional battles
between the CFTC and the SEC with respect to investments that
could be characterized either as futures contracts or as securities.
The Modernization Act eliminated the former monopoly by
permitting over-the-counter and essentially unregulated
transactions between qualified market participants.
Commodities law formerly imposed a gate-keeping
requirement on the types of permissible derivatives contracts that
served a similar function to the insurable interest requirement for
insurance policies. Until the adoption of the amendments to the
Commodity Exchange Act that were brought in by the
Modernization Act of 2000,'1 the CFTC and the various
commodity contract markets had to approve each contract that
was traded.' 9 One of the purposes of this approval process was to
assure the economic integrity of each contract. This contract
approval process functioned in much the same way as insurance
regulation. The Act also changed the designation process so that
the CFTC no longer had responsibility for reviewing the
economics underlying publicly traded derivatives. Preapproval of
the terms of insurance contracts parallels the CFTC's former role
in approving futures contracts before they could be publicly
traded. To the extent that insurance resembles the derivative
investment markets, then it seems appropriate to have parallel
regulatory schemes.
To the extent it had jurisdiction, the SEC followed the
16. See generally JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at § 1.04.
17. See, e.g., Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law
Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1099-1100
(2000) (stating "[e]arly insurance schemes were relatively straightforward forms of
gambling, with people insuring against the death of public figures with whom they
had no personal relationship"); see also, e.g., GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW OF
REINSURANCE § 6:1 (1993) (citing 1 SIR M. MUSTILL & J. GILMAN, ARNOULD ON THE
LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE AND AVERAGE §§ 331-410 (16th ed. 1981)); Michael J.
Henke, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Meets the Texas Insurable Interest
Requirement: A Train Wreck in Progress, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 51 (2003) (discussing
the Texas "insurable interest" doctrine in conjunction with corporate-owned life
insurance policies, which many employers take out on employees).
18. Pub. Law No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006)).
19. See generally JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at § 1.04.
2009]
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CFTC's lead in taking a hands-off approach to the over-the-
counter derivatives markets.0 Some sort of regulation now seems
inevitable but which regulator should fill the regulatory gap?
In making the distinction between insurance and
derivatives contracts used to hedge risks, we should not lose sight
of the moral hazard concern that leads to the insurable interest
requirement imposed by insurance regulation. Nor should we lose
sight of the similarity to gambling. Gambles and wagers are not
the only examples of contracts that have been outlawed because of
their perceived moral repugnancy. In 2003, the Pentagon devised
a short-lived plan to create a futures market to allow a hedging
against future terrorist attacks.21  The proposal was quickly
quashed. What was it about the proposed terrorism futures that
the public found so horrific? Some observers suggested that a
market for terrorism futures would allow people to profit from
sharing information about future attacks that they should share
simply as a matter of good citizenship.23 There is also the visceral
reaction that an investor should not be able to profit from
someone else's misery. We, however, generally do not look at an
investor's motives in determining whether a particular transaction
20. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION §§ 1.5, 1.7 (6th ed. forthcoming 2009) (discussing SEC and CFTC
jurisdiction over derivatives contracts).
21. See, e.g., Daniel Kadlec, Terrorism Futures: Good Concept, Bad P.R., TIME
MAGAZINE, Aug. 4, 2003, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,91
71,1101030811-472877,00.html. The idea behind the proposal was that since markets
help filter information, a market in terrorism futures could provide the Pentagon with
help in predicting and then thwarting attacks. See Jeff Brown, Was Terrorist Futures
Market Really Such a Terrible Scheme?, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 31, 2003,
at C01; Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, The Furor Over 'Terrorism Futures,' THE
WASHINGTON POST, July 31, 2003, at A19.
22. For example, the originator of the controversial idea resigned his research
post with the Defense Department in the face of the huge public opposition to
terrorism futures even as a hypothetical model. See David Voss, From Sputnik to...
Radar? Much-Maligned Defense Research Agency Has Long Been the Pentagon's
Fantasy Shop, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2003, at D1.
23. See, e.g., D. J. Tice, "Terror Market" Debate Exposed Roots of Many
Economic Disagreements, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 6, 2003, at A10. (stating "a
terrorism market would inspire people to do out of a selfish desire for gain what they
should have done out of moral decency - to tell what they know. And of course
that's just the problem. The motives of terrorism 'investors' would be simply too
barbarous to be tolerated, and too repulsive to be used, even for the best of purposes.
No result, however, beneficial, is worth the moral debasement in rewarding such
motives - or at least that's what the politicians quickly decided").
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is legal. When put in perspective, how different is a terrorism
futures contract from taking out insurance against acts of war? An
investor who stands to gain from a terror attack may simply be
hedging against losses that would result from such an attack.
Investors have always been able to take investment positions in
order to "bet" in favor of disaster. There are other ways to invest
in terror-related disaster. Defense industry stocks and gold have
traditionally been among the havens for investors desiring
economic protection against the ill-effects of war or terrorism but
these investments are made as part of the regulated securities
markets if made through securities or publicly traded futures
contracts, unless the investor makes direct purchases of gold. Just
as betting on terrorism raises moral hazard issues, so should
betting on wide-spread credit defaults such as could be done
through the CDS market or through synthetic CDOs.
To some extent, any form of market regulation is
paternalistic, but that paternalism is justified. One of the longtime
premises of securities regulation is that investors need protection
not only against those who would take advantage of them, but also
against themselves. The wholesale deregulation of the
sophisticated derivatives markets has proven to be a failed free
market experiment. No doubt some form of regulation will be
imposed. In terms of how the regulatory schemes should evolve,
one could argue that the CFTC would be the appropriate regulator
as these derivatives grew out of what formerly were known as the
commodities markets. On the other hand, the intertwining of
derivatives with other financial instruments led the SEC to put in
its bid to regulate the CDS market. To the extent that the CDS
markets derive their justification as a type of insurance, then
insurance regulation could be seen as the appropriate fix,
permitting only those market participants with an insurable
interest and those counterparties subject to regulation as an
insurance provider. An insurable interest has long been a
requirement of insurance law.24 It requires an insurable interest in
24. As a line-drawing rule as to which contracts are enforceable, a bright line test
is not applicable. The law in this area is quite muddled. See, e.g., STARING, supra
note 17, at § 6:1 (citing MUSTILL & GILMAN, supra note 17, at §§ 331-410) (stating
"[iln limited space we can talk around insurable interest but never talk it through. A
standard text confesses that '[i]t is very difficult to give any definition of an insurable
20091
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the contingency insured against in order to uphold the insurance
contract.2' This doctrine originated with life insurance. 2' For
example, there was the practice of taking out insurance on famous
people and then speculating on their demise much in the same way
as any gamble. 27 This practice of wagering on celebrity lives raised
a public policy issue often expressed in terms of the policy against
28gambling. The law in essence sets up a presumption that an
insurance contract is a wager on the occurrence or nonoccurrence
of a particular contingency and that presumption can be rebutted
by demonstrating an insurable interest: "proof of circumstances
that negative the existence of a wagering intent establishes the
existence of an insurable interest." 29 New York's statute is typical
interest,' and then discusses it for about [seventy] pages"). Only an overview is
presented here.
25. See Henke, supra note 17, at 54-59.
26. Kreitner, supra note 17, at 1116; see also, e.g., American Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340
F.2d 469, 469-72 (10th Cir. 1964) (upholding employer's insurable interest in life of
employee); 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §§ 41:1 & 41:17 (1997); John M. Limbaugh,
Note, Life Insurance as Security for a Debt and the Applicability of the Rule Against
Wager Contracts: Estate of Bean v. Hazel, 64 Mo. L. REV. 693 (1999).
27. See Lorraine J. Daston, The Domestication of Risk: Mathematical Probability
and Insurance 1650-1830, 1 THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION 237, 244 (Lorenz
Kruger et al. eds., 1987) (stating "London underwriters issued policies on the lives of
celebrities like Sir Robert Walpole, the success of battles, the succession of Louis
XV's mistresses, the outcome of sensational trials, the fate of 800 German
immigrants who arrived in 1765 without food and shelter, and in short served as
bookmakers for all and sundry bets").
28. See, e.g., George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of Company-Owned
Life Insurance (COLI): Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. V. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 357, 357 (2003) (stating:
Economic insights are studied to ascertain the economic function
of the insurable interest doctrine. Public policy contrary to
gambling, and the public interest in the minimization of moral
hazard, each has been proposed as justification of that doctrine.
However, each in turn will be seen to lack sufficient economic
weight to justify the doctrine. The economic phenomenon of
externality seems to be the true rationale for the application of the
insurable interest doctrine to [company owned life insurance]);
Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 725-27 (2000); Lynne A. Stout, Why the
Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC
Derivatives, 48 Duke L.J. 701, 724-728 (1999); see also, e.g., 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE
2D § 24:117 (1984); Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Prepayment Clauses: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 40 UCLA L. REV. 851, 882 (1993).
29. ROGER C. HENDERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY II, INSURANCE LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 25 (2d ed. 1996).
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of the modern statement of the insurable interest requirement:
No contract or policy of insurance on property made
or issued in this state, or made or issued upon any
property in this state, shall be enforceable except for
the benefit of some person having an insurable
interest in the property insured. In this article,
"insurable interest" shall include any lawful and
substantial economic interest in the safety or
preservation of property from loss, destruction or• 30
pecuniary damage.
The insurable interest requirement of a "lawful and
substantial economic interest" describes the type of interest that is
present when commercial enterprises decide to enter into hedging
contracts. But, it is not always easy to distinguish gambling and
insurance. For example, the football game creates the risk of one
team winning and the other losing. Similarly, the roll of the dice is
the act that creates the risk (of a specific number or pips being
exposed). These football and dice games can be enjoyed without
the wager. The wager simply adds economic consequences for the
parties to the wager, much as a derivatives contract on the price of
a commodity provides economic consequences for the speculator.
The insurable interest doctrine attempts to provide a basis for
drawing the line with respect to insurance contracts that the law
will tolerate. It is an imperfect measure at best.
The insurable interest requirement is analogous to the
economic purpose requirement that formerly applied to
derivatives contracts. Prior to the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000,3" publicly traded derivatives contracts
required approval by the CFTC and the various commodity
contract markets. One reason for this approval process was to
assure the economic integrity of each contract . This contract
30. N.Y. Ins. L. § 3401 (McKinney 2007); see also, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 280-284
(West 2005).
31. Pub. Law No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2006)).
32. See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at § 2.03.
20091
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approval process functioned in much the same way as the
requirement of insurance regulation that requires state insurance
regulators approve insurance policies that are marketed to
consumers." Policymakers should consider whether the failure of
the CDS markets has signaled a need to revitalize the commodities
laws' economic purpose requirement.
Contrary to the deregulatory trend with respect to
gambling activities and the non-securities derivatives markets,
insurance remains a highly regulated industry. Several
justifications have been advanced for regulating insurance.34 The
justifications that are most analogous to the traditional
justifications for regulation of the investment markets include the
need "to compensate for inadequate information."35 This rationale
for regulating insurance closely parallels the reasons for
implementing the disclosure requirements of the federal securities
laws. The justification for strong insurance laws and the
accompanying substantive regulation of the terms of insurance
contracts is paternalism. Paternalism is controversial since it
sacrifices freedom of contract for what policy makers deem to be
consistent with "the common good."36 Nevertheless, policy makers
have wisely recognized that a paternalistic approach is appropriate
when dealing with risk-shifting using insurance products. The
justifications for substantive regulation of insurance contracts may
33. See, e.g., 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 2.8 (1997).
34. See, e.g., JERRY, supra note 3, at 51-54; Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of
Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45
MINN. L. REV. 471 (1960); see also JERRY, supra note 3, at 85 (stating:
Although the larger objectives of insurance regulation are to
prevent destructive competition, compensate for inadequate
information, relieve unequal bargaining power, and assist
consumers incapable of rationally acting in their best interests, the
articulated objectives of state legislative regulation are essentially
fourfold: (1) ensuring that consumers are charged fair and
reasonable prices for insurance products; (2) protecting the
solvency of insurers; (3) preventing unfair practices and
overreaching by insurers; and (4) guaranteeing the availability of
coverage to the public).
The first three objectives apply equally to securities and other investment regulation.
35. JERRY, supra note 3, at 52.
36. JERRY, supra note 3, at 53-54.
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be equally applicable to derivatives regulation - whether that be
under the umbrella and rubric of securities regulation or what has
traditionally been known as commodities regulation. It thus is
time to consider reinvigorating the federal commodities laws in
addition to strengthening the securities laws as they apply to
derivatives.
Over the next several years policy makers need to consider
a number of questions, including, for example, whether the
CFTC's familiarity with existing derivatives regulation is sufficient
to extend it to the CDS and other over-the-counter derivatives
markets or whether the SEC is better equipped to fashion suitable
regulation. Other suggestions that have been made include
merging the CFTC and SEC, establishing the Treasury
Department as the overseer of the SEC and CFTC, or the creation
of a new Financial Regulatory Authority to regulate both the
securities and derivatives markets as is done in the United
Kingdom. Yet another question is the extent to which investment
market regulation should be more directly tied to banking and
other financial institution regulation.
The dividing lines between futures, swaps and other
derivatives, securities, insurance, and gambling regulation have
been blurred.37  The overlapping nature of the sophisticated
financial markets makes it difficult to identify the most natural
regulator. It follows that instead, we should look for the most
suitable regulator in terms of expertise and understanding of the
complex financial and derivatives markets. One thing is clear: we
need to avoid continuation of a regulatory gap simply because
market participants can disguise insurance or gambling as a
derivatives contract. Policy makers should focus on substance -
regulation that is not dependent on the form of the contract but
rather is designed to apply across risk-shifting markets.
37. See generally JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 12, at § 1.02.
2009]

